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An Explanation of Disagreements Over what Counts as Adequate Justi-
fication
Ole Andreassen,1 University of Oxford
￿
In public and private life, we often disagree about what counts as ade-
quate justification. These disagreements can have massive consequences,
as when climate change deniers hold that the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change does not confer adequate justification regarding the
existence of climate change. The disagreements can also be trivial, as
when I hold that the opinions of my girlfriend’s grandmother does not
confer adequate justification regarding what is the best cure for a cold.
Such disagreements can occur in most areas of our justificatory practices,
and often devolve into shouting matches with no rational argument or
epistemic virtue whatsoever. They might easily seem irrational. Can a
theory of justification explain such disagreements?
It is desirable for a theory of justification to be more or less aligned
with actual justificatory practices. In this paper I show how a theory
of justification can integrate disagreements regarding what counts as
adequate justification, and do so in a way which treats these disagree-
ments as more than mere irrational shouting matches. My argument is
inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (hereafter ‘OC’).2 In OC,
Wittgenstein claims that we can disagree about what counts as adequate
justification. This led A. C. Grayling (2001: 309) to accuse On Certainty
1 Ole Andreassen is a Norwegian student reading for a BA in PPE at Lincoln Col-
lege, University of Oxford.
2 References to On Certainty will take the form ‘OC: X’, where x is the relevant
section number(s).
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of espousing relativist scepticism regarding justification: the view that
what we count as justified is just one of many possible mutually incom-
patible sets of what is counted as justified, and that there is nothing
more to justification than being ‘justified relative to a system’.
Relativist scepticism regarding justification can be seen as trouble-
some, for the following reason: Justification is truth-conducive, and
prima facie, a justified belief is more likely to be true than an unjusti-
fied belief. If being justified is nothing more than being justified relative
to a system, we might fear that justification is not in fact truth-conducive,
or that this truth-conduciveness is not guaranteed. After all, might not
the belief be justified relative to a poor system, which does not correlate
justification and truth? If we can only explain disagreement over what
counts as adequate justification by opening for this fear, then we will
lose more than we gain, and it is better to treat the disagreements as
inexplicable. I will argue that we need not fear this.
In order to do so I will, in section II, outline a theory of justification in-
spired by OC. In section III, I set forth a crucial distinction between what
I term, ‘subjective justification’ and, ‘objective justification’. Roughly
speaking, I am subjectively justified if, had all my beliefs regarding the
matter at hand been true, I would have been justified. I am objectively
justified iff I am subjectively justified, and all (or a sufficient number) of
my beliefs regarding the matter at hand are in fact true. In section IV, I
show how the theory of justification of section II can use the distinction
between subjective and objective justification to integrate disagreements
regarding what counts as justification without severing the link between
justification and truth.
￿ ￿
The theory of justification which follows tries to align itself as much as
possible with our actual justificatory practices. Justification is to a large
extent a social activity; we try to convince others to accept our positions,
by showing how these positions are justified. We do so by giving reasons
and evidence in favour of our position. Consider the following:
[. . . ] Someone with bad sight asks me: ‘do you believe that
the thing we can see there is a tree?’ I reply, ‘I know it is; I
can see it clearly and am familiar with it’. Or, A: ‘Isn’t N.N.
at home?’ B: ‘I believe he is’. A: ‘Was he at home yesterday?’
B: ‘Yesterday he was, I know he was; I spoke to him’. A: ‘Do
you know or only believe that this part of the house is built
on later than the rest?’ B: ‘I know it is; I got it from so, and
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so’. In these cases, then, one says, ‘I know’, and mentions
how one knows, or at least one can do so (OC: 483—4).
In order to make a proper knowledge-claim, one must be able to men-
tion how one knows. I take it for granted that one can only make a
proper knowledge-claim that X if one’s belief that X is justified. OC:
483—4 seems perfectly straightforward and yet, it conflicts everyday
with many widely-held theories of justification. If one must be able
to mention how one knows if one is justified, one’s justification must
be mentally accessible, and many, e.g. Goldman (1967), deny this. A
full treatment of this debate would be far beyond the scope of this paper,
and I will merely take it for granted that justification is mentally accessible
and evidentialist.
Our everyday justificatory practices are also linear: If I say that I know
that Anne has a boyfriend, you might ask me how I know this, and I
might reply that Becky told me. Now, it is supremely reasonable to hold
that a belief can only confer justification if it is itself justified. If Becky
had only told me that Anne is going to the cinema with a young man, I
(putatively) would not be justified in believing that Becky has told that
Anne has a boyfriend, and hence I would not be justified in believing
that Anne has a boyfriend. The linearity of justification, coupled with the
claim that a belief can only confer justification if it is itself justified, leads
to a familiar problem in epistemology: the infinite justificatory regress. I
want to justify belief (1) by reference to belief (2), but, I can only do
so if belief (2) is justified. I must justify belief (2) by reference to belief
(3), but I can only do so if belief (3) is justified. I must justify belief (3)
by reference to belief (4) [. . . ] and so on. If we grant the linearity of
justification, there are two ways of facing the infinite regress: either (A)
let it run on forever, or (B) defuse it by holding that some beliefs can
be justified even though they are not justified by reference to any other
beliefs.
The infinite justificatory regress never arises in everyday discussions.
We give reasons and justify ourselves up to a point, but sooner or later
we stop. If our conversation partner refuses to accept this as a justifi-
cation, we simply give up, and exclaim that our conversation partner
does not understand what counts as adequate justification. Wittgenstein
held that this is a crucial feature of our everyday justificatory practice;
all linear justifictaroy chains stop at some beliefs which are held with
absolute certainty (OC: 137). Examples of such beliefs are, ‘all human
beings have parents’, ‘this is a chair’, ‘all humans have lived their lives
very close to the surface of the Earth’.3 Wittgenstein gives the following
3 The examples are mine, but are inspired by Moore (1959).
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example: Consider a school teacher trying to teach a child that Athens is
the capital of Greece. The pupil might ask how the teacher knows this:
The teacher will feel that this is not really a legitimate ques-
tion at all. And it would be just the same if the pupil cast
doubt on the uniformity of nature, that is to say on the jus-
tification of inductive arguments. The teacher would feel
that this was only holding them up, that this way the pupil
would only get stuck and make no progress. And, he would
be right. It would be as if someone were looking for some
object in a room; he opens a drawer and doesn’t see it there;
then he closes it again, waits, and opens it once more to see
if perhaps it isn’t there now, and keeps on like that. He has
not learned to look for things. In the same way, this pupil
has not learned how to ask questions (OC: 315).
This quote contains two crucial points. Firstly, that justificatory chains
end, and they end in a variety of common-place and theoretical beliefs.
In a memorable phrase, these beliefs are like the hinges on which our
investigations and epistemic practices turn (OC: 343). If we doubt these
‘hinges’, we will not get anywhere, and will be stuck in a manner sim-
ilar to the person opening and closing his drawer. Secondly, that we
are taught, explicitly or implicitly, where the justificatory chains end;
this knowledge is not innate, nor do we reach it through pure rational
introspection. Joachim Schulte (2005: 69) stresses the close connection
between the community we live in and what beliefs we hold as ‘hinges’.
He holds that the ‘hinges’ are part of the inheritance of ‘the more or less
theoretical means we have devised for coping with the world we live
in’. It is crucial to note that this does not mean that the ‘hinges’ are
necessarily true. In section IV, I discuss an example where they are not.
I will refer to the ‘hinges’ as Moorean Propositions, or MPs for short,
as they were first drawn attention to by Moore (1959). The theory of
justification I will embrace is one where a belief B is justified iff a lin-
ear, evidentialist, justificatory chain goes from B and terminates in a
Moorean Proposition.4
￿ ￿ ￿
Having outlined the theory of justification in the last section, I can now
move on to the distinction between subjective justification and objective
4 I will not discuss if Moorean Propositions themselves can be justified, how they
can be justified or whether they are justified. For discussions of this, see McGinn
(1989) and Pritchard (2011).
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justification. A speaker is subjectively justified in his belief that P iff
were all the speaker’s beliefs regarding P true and known to be true, the
speaker would be certain that he is justified in his belief that P, and his
certainty would be reasonable. A speaker is objectively justified in his
belief that P iff a sufficient conjunction of the beliefs used to justify the
belief that P are in fact true and really do confer justification. You can
believe that you are justified in believing that P due to a belief that Q; if
your assessment of the situation has been thorough, it follows that your
belief that P is subjectively justified. However, Q, might be false, and it
might then be the case that you are not objectively justified in your belief
that P.
Objective justification entails subjective justification. Subjective justi-
fication does not entail objective justification. The distinction between
objective and subjective justification is highlighted in the following ex-
ample:
Tragedy: Isaac convincingly threatens Julie, a police officer,
with a gun replica, such that Julie is justified in believing
that she is being threatened with a real gun. Believing no
other course of action open to her, Julie shoots Isaac.
It is clear that Julie was subjectively justified in believing that she
was being threatened with a gun, and, I assume, subjectively justified in
believing that no other course of action was open to her. It is also clear
that Julie was not objectively justified in believing that she was being
threatened with a real gun and that shooting Isaac was the only course
of action open to her; if Julie had no false beliefs, and knew that Isaac
only had a gun replica, she would not have shot him.5
￿￿
The aim of this paper is to show how a theory of justification can inte-
grate disagreements regarding what counts as adequate justification, in
a way which treats these disagreements as more than inexplicable irra-
tionality on the behalf of one of the participants. Wittgenstein gives an
example of one such disagreement:
5 The distinction between subjective and objective justification is brought out very
strongly by examples such as Tragedy. Nevertheless, the distinction makes a
claim which has sometimes been denied, namely that a belief can be justified
even if its truth is not one hundred percent certain. Since this claim does not
square with our everyday justificatory practices, I reject it (see OC: 12, 13). See
also the end of section IV.
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Supposing we met people who did not regard [scientific ex-
periments] as a telling reason. Now how do we imagine
this? Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle. (And
for that, we consider them primitive). Is it wrong for them
to consult an oracle and be guided by it? If we call this
‘wrong’, aren’t we using our language-game as a base from
which to combat theirs? And are we right, or wrong, to com-
bat it? Of course there are all sorts of slogans which will be
used to support our proceedings. Where two principles re-
ally do meet, which cannot be reconciled with one another,
then, each man declares the other a fool and heretic. I said
I would, ‘combat’ the other man, but wouldn’t I give him
reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end
of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when
missionaries convert natives). (OC: 609—612).
The passage claims that when disagreement about what counts as
adequate justification happens, our arguments about whether or not a
given belief is justified do not involve reason. This aligns with my ini-
tial presentation of the issue. Rather, they involve coercive persuasion;
combatting the other, converting him to our side. Prima facie, we might
think that you can never be (subjectively) justified in holding a belief
if you were initially coerced into holding it. Section II above, gives us
reason to doubt this prima facie intuition; our justificatory practices are
intimately connected to what we have been taught, and some things we
have been taught not through reasons, but through persuasion. An ex-
ample would be a child learning the multiplication table; his teacher tells
him that something is the case, e.g. 6 ⇤ 7 = 42, and once the child has
learnt the multiplication table, he sees that it is indeed the case. How-
ever, different people learn different things. As Wittgenstein points out
in the above quote, this means that different things will count as ade-
quate (subjective) justification to different people.
Call the people in Wittgenstein’s example the Delphists. We and the
Delphists share some views of what are adequate grounds for justifica-
tion; we would both accept: ‘this is my hand’, ‘I am sitting on a chair’,
etc., as Moorean Propositions, i.e., adequate end-points for justificatory
chains. However, the Delphists also hold that oracular prophecy are
adequate end-points for justificatory chains, and deny that laboratory
experiments are adequate end-points for justificatory chains.
We, of course, deny the justificatory power of oracular power, and
extoll the justificatory virtue of properly carried-out laboratory experi-
ments. The set of our Moorean Propositions, while overlapping, does
not coincide. Call the Moorean Propositions unique to the Delphist Del-
phist Propositions, DP. And, call the Moorean Propositions unique to
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 47
us Scientific Propositions, SP. Continue to refer to the Moorean Proposi-
tions we have in common as MPs. If I have a discussion with a Delphist
about a proposition P, and both the Delphist and I have only MPs at the
end of the justifications we give, then, ‘our principles can be reconciled
with one another’, and we need only appeal to reasons and justifications
in our discussion. Our discussion will be rational and might exemplify
epistemic virtues. But, if we disagree about a proposition Q, and at the
end of my justificatory chain is an SP, or at the end of the Delphist’s
justificatory chain is a DP, or both, then matters cannot be resolved as
straightforwardly.
When we try to engage in an argument about Q, the Delphist justifies
himself using means I do not count as valid justification (and vice versa).
This is why we can only, ‘declare the other a fool and heretic’ (OC: 611).
Yet, Wittgenstein also insists that ‘we say: these people do not know a
lot that we know. And, let them be never so sure of their belief; they
are wrong and we know it. If we compare our system of knowledge
with theirs then theirs is evidently the poorer one by far’ (OC: 286). The
quote is ambiguous; is the Delphists’ the poorer system of knowledge
from our perspective, or is it objectively poorer? I will read Wittgenstein as
saying ‘objectively poorer’. Let us consider what sorts of combats we
and the Delphists might engage in to establish whether the DPs should
yield before the SPs or vice versa. We might engage in trials of predictive
power. A set of challenges are set, some of which are specified by the
Delphists, some of which are specified by us. If we predict the correct
outcome more often than the Delphists, we might slowly convert them
to our view, and make them abandon their Delphist Propositions.
Failure in such predictive trials would erode the support the DPs have
in the Delphist’s belief systems. The failure would not make the Del-
phist’s rationally abandon the DPs due to a further belief that predic-
tive trials should validate all types of adequate justification.6 Rather, it
would place the Delphists under mental stress due to the repeated, and
for them inexplicable, predictive failure of the DPs. It is important to
note that such predictive trials would only work if we, and the Delphists,
shared many Moorean Propositions, and had a roughly similar way of
life. If this were not the case, we might not be able to agree on what
would count as success or failure in the trial. But, we and the Delphists
alike are human, and being human we are biologically and psychologi-
6 If this had been the case, we and the Delphists would agree regarding what
should count as adequate justification; our apparent divergence would be due
to us knowing empirical facts regarding predictive success and failure which the
Delphists did not know about until they saw the results of the predictive trials.
This is not what I mean, nor is it what Wittgenstein meant, by ‘conversion’.
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cally very similar, and so we are likely to have roughly similar ways of
life.
The case of the Delphists illustrates how, on the theory of justification
presented, there can be a multiplicity of what counts as subjective justifi-
cation. Due to this multiplicity, our normal justificatory practices might
come short in discussions with those with different practices, e.g. the
Delphists. Relativism about subjective justification leads to the need for
‘combats’ of the sort described above, for we cannot rationally discuss
the ‘hinges’ on which our justificatory practices turn. However, we can
here simply beg the case against scepticism and hold that these ‘com-
bats’ will have a single victor.7 If this is the case, then we can accept the
multiplicity of subjective justification and still reject relativism about ob-
jective justification, and hence we can also reject relativism about truth.
Grayling’s worries were misplaced.
However, in integrating disagreements about what counts as adequate
justification, the theory of justification entails relativism about subjective
justification. Should this trouble us? After all, the Delphists held the Del-
phist Propositions to be justified, even though they were false. So, might
not the Scientific Propositions and the rest of our Moorean Propositions
also turn out to be false? By allowing people to be subjectively justified
in holding false beliefs, are we cheapening the very concept of justifica-
tion?
Wittgenstein considers such an argument in OC: 599. He concludes
that ‘the argument is worthless’. A belief that P might be subjectively
justified, and we might be warranted in making a knowledge-claim that
P, even though P is false. A refusal to do so would be to equate sub-
jective justification with absolute certainty. In actual practice we do not
do so (OC: 12, 13). We distinguish between objective and subjective jus-
tification, and this distinction collapses if subjective justification presup-
poses absolute certainty. If we accept our actual justificatory practices
as roughly correct, which Wittgenstein holds that we should, it follows
that we should not be worried by the fact that one might be subjectively
justified without being objectively justified. Hence, I have shown that
disagreements about what counts as adequate justification are not inex-
plicable, and that they should not make us worry; that what we count
as adequate justification is in fact, inadequate.
7 Some might hold that a theory of justification, if correct, should intrinsically dis-
prove scepticism. I here reject this requirement: the theory of justification pre-
sented does not disprove scepticism. It must rely on anti-sceptical arguments to
do so. I do not hold this to be a weakness of the theory, but others might.
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